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Abstract 
This paper assesses the United States position on the protection of hate speech under 
the First Amendment and questions whether, in light of the harm hate speech causes 
and the inconsistencies with free speech rationales, the position is justified. The most 
recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue is Snyder v Phelps which this 
paper utilizes as an exemplar of the state’s aversion to regulating speech on the basis 
of content. The ultimate thesis of this paper is that while hate speech is a complex 
issue, especially given the United States constitutional climate, complete lack of 
regulation leaves an appreciable harm without a remedy. The approach in the United 
States can no longer be justified in reliance on oft cited free speech rationales. 
Though international experiences in hate speech regulation have not been without 
their difficulties, it serves to illustrate the point that regulating some forms of speech 
on the basis of content does not necessarily result in the “chilling effect” that heavily 
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I  Hate Speech: The First Amendment  
 
A Introduction  
 
Scholars note that states are currently undergoing a global “third wave” of hate 
propaganda, typically characterized by the dissemination of cyber hate and the 
expansion of target groups.1 Despite perceptions, hate speech is not an issue that died 
with the prosecution of anti-Jewish and anti-Black hate propaganda in the 1970s and 
1980s. 2  The promulgation of hateful messages, whether based on discriminatory 
views grounded in gender, race, religion or otherwise, results in real harm, both to the 
intended victims and to the society in which it is permitted to fester. The means by 
which states are addressing the issue of hate speech therefore remains to be an 
important question, and is the central focus of this paper.  
 
Part I will seek to provide an exposition of the constitutional protection attributed to 
hate speech under the First Amendment in the United States, and criticisms thereof as 
assessed against the contribution hate speech makes to the three most commonly cited 
rationales behind stringent speech protection. These are the market place of ideas, 
democratic debate and individual self-fulfillment. Part II will assess the treatment of 
hate speech in the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue in Snyder v 
Phelps, as a means to further demonstrate the United States aversion to allowing 
regulation of speech on the sole ground of the speech’s offensive or disagreeable 
content. The final part of this paper (Part III) will adopt a comparative approach, and 
look to how the politically congenial states of Canada, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand have dealt with this issue, and problems they have faced in doing so.   
 
The ultimate thesis of this paper is that while hate speech is a complex issue, 
especially in the context of the United States constitutional climate, complete lack of 
regulation leaves an appreciable harm without a remedy. The approach in the United 
States can no longer be justified by relying on oft-cited free speech rationales. Though 
                                                        
1 Jonathan Cohen “More Censorship or Less Discrimination? Sexual Orientation Hate Propaganda in 
Multiple Perspectives” (2000) 46 McGill L Rev 69 at 78.  
2 Cohen, above n 1, 78; Chris Gosnell “Hate Speech on the Internet: A Question of Context” (1998) 23 
Queens L J 369. 
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international experiences in hate speech regulation have not been without their 
difficulties, it serves to illustrate the point that regulating speech on the basis of 
content does not necessarily result in the “chilling effect” that so heavily concerns 
First Amendment scholars.   
 
B “Freedom for the Thought We Hate”  
 
1 Defining hate speech 
 
‘Hate Speech’ is notoriously difficult to define in any legislative scheme, involving 
contested parameters of intent, effect, incitement and harm causation, and contested 
exceptions for fact, comment, religious belief and humor.3 As a concept in legal and 
political theory, it refers to verbal conduct which willfully expresses intense antipathy 
towards some group or towards an individual on the basis of membership in some 
group.4 The groups in question are usually those distinguished by ethnicity, religion 
or sexual orientation.5 It is not to be confused with other toxins that pollute public 
discourse: Incivility, overheated rhetoric, and speech which merely causes offence. 
By contrast, hate speech is language tuned to the frequency of hate which has the 
impact of excluding a targeted group from wider society.6  
 
2 The First Amendment  
 
American First Amendment case law and jurisprudence holds that the First 
Amendment protects the speech we hate just as rigorously as the speech we value.7 
The wording of the First Amendment is unequivocal. It states:8 
 
 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of 
                                                        
3 Claudia Geiringer and Steven Price “Moving from Self-Justification to Demonstrable Justification – 
the Bill of Rights and the Broadcasting Standards Authority” in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) 
Law, Liberty, Legislation (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2008) 294 at 318. 
4 Robert Mark Simpson “Dignity, Harm and Hate speech” (2013) 32 Law and Philosophy 701 at 701.  
5 Simpson, above n 4, at 701.  
6 Gary Fry “Hate Speech: Anything Goes” Arizona Attorney (Arizona, October 2011) at 76.   
7 Anthony Lewis Freedom for the Thought we Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment (Basic 
Books, New York, 2007).   
8 The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 1.   
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the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.  
 
However, despite a perception that the First Amendment rights are absolute, 9 the 
United States Supreme Court has over time created categorical exceptions to this 
unequivocal statement, and established a hierarchy of classes of speech based on their 
value. Rather than balancing the First Amendment value of the speech against 
competing rights or social harm, Courts have typically carved out categories of 
expression that are deprived of constitutional protection (or are more capable of 
restriction).10 High value speech worthy of the utmost levels of protection under the 
First Amendment includes political speech11, religious speech12, and scientific, artistic 
and educational speech. Low value speech which is more amenable to restriction 
includes pornography and obscenity 13 , false statements of fact (or defamatory 
statements), true threats14 and ‘fighting words’.15  
 
The ‘fighting words’ concept was established in Chaplinski v New Hampshire16 where 
it was held that speech is unprotected if it constitutes words that are without social 
value, are directed to a specific individual, and would provoke a reasonable member 
of the group about whom the words are spoken.17 A person cannot utter a racial or 
ethnic epithet to another if those words are likely to cause the listener to react 
violently. This ‘fighting words’ exception or category has been substantially narrowed 
by later cases, namely Cohen v California18  which made it clear that offensiveness 
would not suffice to categorize the speech as fighting words. Cohen also suggests that 
the Court would be resistant to adding additional categories of unprotected speech, 
                                                        
9 See, for example, Alex Kozinski and Eugene Volokh “A Penumbra Too Far” (1993) 106 Harv L Rev 
1639 at 1654 who characterized the First Amendment as “about as close to absolute as the Constitution 
gets”.  
10 See, for example, Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973); Daniel A. Farber “The Categorical 
Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law” (2009) 84 Indiana L J 917 at 922.  
11 See, for example, New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) at 270; Hustler Magazine v Falwell 
485 US 46 (1988) at 51. 
12  See, for example, Cantwell v Conneticut 310 US 296 (1940).  
13 See, for example, Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973).  
14 Virginia v Black 538 US 343 (2003)  
15 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 315 US 568 (1942).  
16 Chaplinski, above n 15. 
17 Chaplinsky, above n 15.  
18 Cohen v California 403 US 15 (1971); Farber, above n 10, at 921.  
FREEDOM OF HATE SPEECH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, SNYDER V PHELPS AND BEYOND.  
 8 
and in the 38 years since the Cohen decision, the Court has added only child 
pornography and “true threats” to the list.19 
 
The protection given to “protected speech” is not unlimited. Although protected 
speech does receive a high degree of protection from direct censorship, even speech 
that enjoys the most extensive First Amendment protection may be subject to 
“regulations of the time, place and manner of expression which are content neutral, 
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication”.20 This has become especially relevant in the 
context of funeral picketing, and states have responded to the rise in funeral protests 
(specifically the infamous activities of the Westboro Baptist Church) by 
implementing these limited regulations. An assessment of whether these regulations 
are sufficiently remedying the harm that is at stake here will be assessed in Part II of 
this paper. 
 
A person whose speech falls under an “unprotected” class of speech can still have a 
First Amendment claim. The cross-burning case of R.A.V v City of St. Paul21  is 
indicative of this. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that the approach of 
categorizing speech into “protected” and “unprotected” classes does not mean that 
unprotected speech is “entirely invisible to the Constitution.”22 What it means is that 
though content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, certain classes of speech 
can be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content, but they 
cannot be made “vehicles for content discrimination” on a broader scale.  23 Justice 
Scalia uses the analogy of the government being constitutionally permitted to lawfully 
proscribe libel; but they may not proscribe libel only critical of government, as this 
amounts to content discrimination.24  
 
The St Paul ordinance at issue in the R.A.V v City of St. Paul criminalized any 
communicative act if the speaker “knows or has reasonable grounds to know” that the 
action “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
                                                        
19 Farber, above n 10, at 917.  
20 Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence 468 US 288 (1984).  
21 R.A.V. v City of St Paul 505 US 377 (1992).  
22 R.A.V, above n 21, at 383.  
23 R.A.V., above n 21, at 383.  
24 R.A.V., above n 21, at 384. 
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religion or gender.” 25  The state court construed the ordinance to apply only to 
“fighting words” of which the Petitioner’s actions of burning a cross on a black 
family’s lawn could constitute. However, Justice Scalia viewed the ordinance as 
impermissible content discrimination, stating that under the Ordinance, abusive 
communications “no matter how vicious or severe” are permitted unless they relate to 
one of the prohibited categories. 26  Expressing hostility on the basis of political 
affiliation or homosexuality for example was permitted. 27   The Ordinance was 
therefore held to be an example of impermissible viewpoint (or content) 
discrimination, which is not permitted even for what has traditionally been placed into 
a category of “unprotected speech”.28  
 
The United States aversion to regulating speech on the basis of content is 
fundamentally at odds with any attempts made at regulating hate speech. The brief for 
the City of St Paul asserted that a general “fighting words” law would not meet the 
city’s needs because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority 
groups that the “group hatred aspect of such speech is not condoned by the 
majority.” 29  However it was unequivocally stated that “the point of the First 
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than 
silencing speech on the basis of its content”30, making the discussion of hate speech in 
the United States a complex one.  
 
C Criticisms and Free Speech Rationales  
 
The United States approach of unwavering protection of hate speech on First 
Amendment grounds has been criticized in the international community for placing 
too much emphasis upon individual freedoms, while failing to recognize the 
“collective dimension of human existence and the rightful role of the state in 
promoting caring, empathetic communities”. 31  The underlying assumption in the 
                                                        
25 Farber, above n 10, at 928. 
26 R.A.V., above n 21, at 384. 
27 Farber, above n 10, at 928.  
28 Farber, above n 10, at 928.  
29 R.A.V., above n 21, at 392.  
30 R.A.V., above n 21, at 392.  
31 Ian Cram “Coercing Communities or Promoting Civilized Discourse? Funeral Protests and 
Comparative Hate Speech Jurisprudence” (2012) 12 H R L Rev 455 at 459.  
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United States is that the truth will ultimately prevail, and thus the best corrective to 
hate speech is more speech.32  This naively presupposes that the countering speech 
will be egalitarian speech inciting a reasoned debate, and completely ignores the harm 
that is being caused to minority groups at the receiving end.33    
 
1  Waldron and the harm in hate speech  
 
Jeremy Waldron in The Harm in Hate Speech rejects the absolutist approach of First 
Amendment jurisprudence and argues hate speech should be regulated “as part of our 
commitment to human dignity and to inclusion and respect for members of vulnerable 
minorities”.34 As will be canvassed in Part III of my paper, the United States differs 
fundamentally in the protection it gives to hate speech from almost every other 
advanced democracy. Waldron questions whether the United States should continue 
to act as an outlier in this regard.35 
 
He provides two key counter arguments to Anthony Lewis’s position that it is better 
to tolerate “the thought we hate” than open the floodgates to state repression.36 Firstly, 
Waldron asserts that the issue is not the thought that we hate “as though defenders of 
free speech laws wanted to get inside people’s minds”. 37  It is the physical 
manifestations of these thoughts, and the subsequent deleterious effect it has on wider 
society:38  
 
“The issue is publication and the harm done to individuals and groups through the 
disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public, and semi-permanent 
announcements to the effect that… members of another group are not worthy of 
equal citizenship.” 
 
                                                        
32 Robert M. O’Neil “Hate Speech, Fighting Words and Beyond: Why American Law is Unique” 
(2013) 76 Alb L Rev 467 at 492. 
33 David O’Brink “Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech” (2001) 7 Legal Theory 
119 at 140.   
34 Jeremy Waldron The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2012).  
35 Waldron, above n 34, at 29.  
36 Waldron, above n 34, at 32. 
37 Waldron, above n 34, at 33.  
38 Waldron, above n 34, at 33.  
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Secondly, the issue is not just our learning to tolerate the thought we hate. He states 
“it is not the harm… to the white liberals who find the racist invective distasteful.”39 
It is not the intellectual resilience to hate speech that is at issue but the direct targets 
and victims of the abuse. Waldron attempts to shift the focus from the 
constitutionality of the rights being asserted by the speaker, to the harm caused to 
those on the receiving end of the speech, and the subsequent harm to wider society. 
First Amendment scholars have a tendency to heavily emphasize the rights of the 
speaker, while framing the potential subsequent harm to members of the audience as 
an infringement of their interests. 40  The terminology of distinguishing between 
“rights” and “interests” suggests the listener’s right to freedom from discrimination to 
be in lesser need of protection. The assertion of individual free speech rights to the 
detriment of competing rights and considerations is what Waldron fundamentally 
opposes, and argues that a communitarian consideration of rights (and interests) needs 
to take prominence.  
 
The harm Waldron highlights can be analyzed as ‘first order’ harms and ‘second 
order’ harms. First order harms are the disadvantages suffered by the immediate 
targets of the hate speech. Waldron goes beyond this analysis however, and also 
considers the prospect of hate speech sustaining complex social structures whose 
wide-scale operations lower the social status of members of targeted groups.41  On a 
societal level, hate speech acts to exacerbate existing inequalities, and may even lead 
to the contribution of a more violent and unstable society (due to the connection 
between hate speech and the commission of hate crimes.)42  Though the extent by 
which hate speech can be held responsible for creating or sustaining identity-based 
social hierarchies is in dispute 43 , it nonetheless has a contributory role to play. 
Ultimately, Waldron seeks to justify the legal restriction of hate speech in account of 
the way it infringes against people’s dignity.  
 
                                                        
39 Waldron, above n 34, at 33.  
40 Guy E. Carmi “Dignity – The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of 
Human Dignity as Free Speech Justification” (2014) 9 U P J Cons L 957 at 992.  
41 See, for example, Simpson, above n 4.   
42 Alan Allport Freedom of Speech (Chelsea House, Philadelphia, 2003) at 25; Michael Whine 
“Expanding Holocaust Denial and Legislation Against It” in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) 
Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 539 at 543.  
43 See, for example, Simpson, above n 4.  
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2 Democratic debate, the marketplace of ideas and individual self-fulfillment  
 
This paper will now turn to the relationship between hate speech and the theories of 
free speech protection, and whether consistencies with the theories serve to justify the 
United States position. There is dispute as to what the framers of the First 
Amendment intended the First Amendment’s precise scope to be. Zecharia Chafee 
argues it was intended “to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further 
prosecutions for criticisms of the government without any incitement to law breaking, 
forever impossible in the United States.” 44  Leonard Williams on the other hand 
contends the framing generation had in mind a narrower scope than Chafee suggested, 
as broad libertarian theories of the First Amendment did not surface until post 1798 
with the rise of Jeffersonians.45 In reality it seems evident that “we know very little of 
the precise intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the speech and press clauses of 
the First Amendment.”46 Because of these uncertainties, it is important to look at the 
rationales for guidance in this field, and adopt a foundational approach to free speech. 
The three primary theories underlying free speech protection are as stated above: The 
protection and promotion of citizen participation in the democratic process, the 
pursuit of truth in the marketplace of ideas, and the citizen’s autonomy rights and 
individual self-fulfillment.   
 
Freedom of expression lies at the heart of democratic governance, and acts to protect, 
promote and encourage citizen participation in the democratic process. Free speech 
guarantees are viewed by most as a necessary implication of democracy, to the extent 
that a state’s democratic status hinges upon the level of protection it gives to free 
speech. 47  Alexander Meiklejohn argues the paramount purpose of free speech 
protection to be the protection of the rights of citizens to engage in political issues so 
                                                        
44 David A. Strauss “Freedom of Speech and the Common Law Constitution” in Lee C. Bollinger and 
Geoffrey R. Stone (eds) Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2002) 33 at 40.   
45 Leonard Williams Levy “Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American 
History” in Walter Berns “Free Speech and Free Government” (1972) 2 Political Science Reviewer 217 
at 219.  
46 Ollman v Evans 750 F 2d 970 (DC Cir 1984) (Bork J concurring).   
47 C. Edwin Baker “Hate Speech” in Michael Herz, Peter Molnar The Content and Context of Hate 
Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) at 65; 
Ronald Dworkin “Foreword” in Weinstein and Hare (eds), above n 42, at viii.  
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as to be able to successfully participate in a democratic society.48 The democracy 
theory therefore primarily rests on the ability of citizens to criticize the government 
and prevent abuses of power.49  
 
Hate speech does not fulfill the democracy rationale for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, 
instead of promoting or encouraging citizen participation, hate speech acts to silence 
or hinder the voices of minority groups.50 Post outlines three ways in which minority 
groups are silenced by hateful speech:51   
 
“(1) Victim groups are silenced because their perspectives are systematically 
excluded from dominant discourse; (2) victim groups are silenced because the 
pervasive stigma of racism systematically undermines and devalues their speech; 
and (3) victim groups are silence because the visceral “fear, rage, [and] shock” of 
racist speech systematically preempts response.”   
 
Ultimately, a target groups ability to publicly defend themselves against 
discriminatory stereotypes is eroded as their status as legitimate and truthful social 
commentators is undermined.52 Though Post limits this analysis to racist hate speech, 
the reasoning is equally applicable to hate speech aimed at other minority groups. In 
the context of hate speech on the basis of sexual orientation for example, the hallmark 
of homophobia has been said to be “the invisibility of its victims”.53 Espousing a 
preference for a heterosexual domination in society, or hatefully advocating rigid or 
traditional gender roles, has an innumerable effect in the sense that it promotes 
“closetry.”54  The number of victims of sexual orientation hate speech cannot be 
quantified, as it can act to push its victims to anonymity and ensures they maintain the 
façade of heterosexuality.  
 
                                                        
48 Alexander Meiklejohn Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (Port Washington, Kennikat 
Press, 1948).  
49 James Weinstein and Ivan Hare “General Introduction: Free Speech, Democracy, and the 
Suppression of Extreme Speech Past and Present” in Hare and Weinstein (eds), above n 42, at 1.  
50 See, for example, Cohen, above n 1, for an analysis on hate speech on grounds of sexual orientation; 
H. L. Gates, A. P. Griffin, D. E. Lively, R. C. Post, W. E. Rubenstein, & N. Strossen (eds) Speaking of 
Race, Speaking of Sex (New York University Press, New York, 1995).  
51 Nadine Strossen  “Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?” in H. L. Gates, A. P. 
Griffin, D. E. Lively, R. C. Post, W. E. Rubenstein, & N. Strossen (eds), above n 50, at 143.  
52 Canadian Bar Association “Submission on Hate Speech under the Canadian Human Rights Act” 
(2010) at [5].  
53 Cohen, above n 1, at 74.   
54 Cohen, above n 1, at 74.  
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Cohen states that the harm here is not limited to the psychological traumas 
experienced by members of the target group, but has far reaching impacts on 
democracy because it removes the group out of the pool of democratic participation.55  
Scholar Nicholas Wolfson furthers this argument, and states that “democratic values 
are cheapened by this process since the oppression by hateful speech lessens the 
ability of subjugated groups to participate on an equal basis in the democratic 
process.”56 When faced with hate speech, many individuals are forced to flee rather 
than engage in dialogue, therefore fundamentally undermining this rationale by 
hindering the free exchange of ideas feeding our search for political truth.57 
 
There is also a conflict with other fundamental democratic values when hate speech is 
left to fester in society. Though the right to free speech has been said to be 
synonymous with democracy 58 , it is not a right that should be asserted to the 
exclusion of all other democratic rights and values. The right to human dignity and 
freedom from discrimination, for example, is enshrined in many domestic Bills of 
Rights and International Human Rights instruments and lies at the core of a stable 
democratic environment.59 Recognition and protection of these rights regardless of 
race, ethnicity religion and sexual orientation is an essential component of democracy. 
The discussion of hate speech inevitably leads to the issue of these contested rights, 
and which democratic right should take prominence. The United States has typically 
prioritized the right to free speech above all else, while European legislative and 
judicial opinion largely falls in favor of the protection of human dignity and 
equality. 60  Therefore the fullest protection of free speech does not further the 
democracy rationale, when such a level of protection does violence to other 
fundamental democratic values.  
 
                                                        
55 Cohen, above n 1, at 75.  
56 Nicholas Wolfson Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech (Praeger Publishers, Connecticut, 1997) at 
84.  
57 See, for example, Ross v New Brunswick School District No. 15 (1996) 1 SCR 825 at 91.  
58 C. Edwin Baker “Hate Speech” in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar The Content and Context of Hate 
Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) at 65; 
See also Dworkin, above n 42, at viii.  
59 See, for example, Bill of Rights Act (NZ), s 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, 
art 1, art 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 27.  
60 See, for example, Norwood v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 111 (ECHR). 
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Lastly, speech (of whatever form) directed at private individuals is not synonymous 
with speech directed at the government or other political institutions. In the hate 
speech context we are primarily dealing with a situation of vulnerable victims with no 
political power, as opposed to critique or comment on the government of the day. 
Thus, to the extent that this rationale can be said to rest upon upholding the rule of 
law and preventing governmental abuses of power, hate speech plays no role in 
furthering this. In summary, the critique observes that hate speech does not take a 
position within democratic discourse, but rather aims at thwarting democracy and 
democracy’s discourses by means of actual or expressive exclusion.61 For this reason, 
this paper submits that the theory from democracy, far from being advanced, is being 
undermined.   
 
The second rationale behind stringent free speech protection is the market place of 
ideas. This theory has its roots in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty which holds that a 
free market place of ideas will by itself uncover truths so long as speech remains 
uninhibited to the fullest extent.62 This line of “Millian thought” was affirmed by 
Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v United States, where he famously stated:63   
 
“…[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -- that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, ... That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.” 
 
In relation to hate speech, this theory holds that society should tolerate even the 
speech it hates, disagrees with or is false, because in free and intellectual debate the 
truth will eventually prevail.64 To prohibit an opinion based on the disagreeable nature 
of the content would undermine the three reasons behind this rationale: Namely that 
the state’s infallibility cannot be unwaveringly accepted, citizens should be able to 
express arguments which in turn promote their intellectual development and the 
development of truth needs to be promoted, by any means.65   
 
                                                        
61 C. Edwin Baker “Hate Speech” in Herz and Molnar (eds), above n 58, at 65.  
62 John Stuart Mill On Liberty first published in 1859 (reprinted by Ticknor and Friends, Boston, 
1863).  
63 Abrams v United States 250 US 616 (1919) (Justice Holmes dissenting) at 630.  
64 Mill, above n 62.  
65 Mill, above n 62.  
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The ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor creates an analogy between ideas to goods and 
services.66 Traditionally, in the goods and services sense, economic theory suggests 
that in a perfect market, good (or trustworthy) products will survive and conquer in 
the market, while bad (or deficient) products will eventually fail.67 However, in the 
context of hate speech and verbal assaults on minority groups, the market place is 
fundamentally flawed and a ‘perfect market’ does not exist. The marketplace theory 
presumes an “even playing field” where each individual comes to the market as 
equals.68 However, as already stated, this is infrequently the case.  This is because the 
instigators of hate speech act as monopolists who provide ‘barriers to entry’ to the 
minorities they are attempting to silence. To push the analogy to a marketplace of 
goods further, most states (including the United States) have regulatory bodies69 who 
ensure anti-competitive behavior within the market does not occur. This may lend 
weight to the argument that a marketplace – whether of ideas, or of goods and 
services – requires some form of regulation to ensure effective operation. 
 
Furthermore, one of the reasons cited in support of this rationale is the promotion of 
the intellectual development of citizens. However, when hate is being professed, 
debate is rarely intellectual or reasoned. Members of organizations espousing hate 
rarely present their views in an environment devoted to open dialogue, in which 
opposing views are encouraged and the promotion of hatred has no room. Rather, hate 
groups are often an uninvited presence, 70  where the purpose of their expressive 
activities is the distillation of hatred against their targets. Therefore it is evident that 
the marketplace metaphor is not a watertight defense for stringent free speech 
protection in the unique context of hate speech. The power plays at stake in this 
specific market are complex and, as has often been asserted, it is superficial to state 
that the best remedy against evil speech is more speech.71 
 
                                                        
66 Laura Beth Nielson License to Harass: Law, Hierarchy, and Offensive Public Speech (Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 2004) at 28.  
67 Herbert Hovenkamp “The Basic Economics of Antitrust” in Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of 
Competition and its Practice (2nd ed, West Group, St Paul, 1999) at 3.  
68 Anthony Cortese Opposing Hate Speech (Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2006) at 138.  
69 See, for example, New Zealand’s Commerce Commission; The United States Federal Trade 
Commission.   
70 The activities of the Westboro Baptist Church prove illustrative.   
71 See, for example, Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927) per Brandeis J at 377; Eric Barendt 
Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005); David A. Strauss “Persuasion, 
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expresion” (1991) 91 Col L Rev 334 at 335.  
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The final rationale this paper will touch on is the ‘autonomy defense’, or the self-
fulfillment theory of free speech. 72  Primarily, “the argument from autonomy… 
maintains that, not to honor an individual’s choice to speak… would violate that 
person’s right to autonomy.”73 The autonomy argument is often invoked to protect all 
kinds of speech (hate speech included) in order to emphasize the notion that the state 
cannot paternalistically dictate to its citizenry which views are correct. 74  Ronald 
Dworkin argues that restricting people’s speech based on contempt for their view of 
good and evil violates their right to autonomy or “moral independence.”75 Under this 
theory, free speech can be justified as an end in itself - Rather than connecting it to 
the collective search for truth or the processes of self-government, it should be 
protected merely because of the high “value of speech conduct to the individual.”76 
The United States Supreme Court in Procunier v Martinez affirmed this rationale as a 
fundamental basis upon which free speech protection rests, stating:77  
 
“The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity, but also those of 
the human spirit -- a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an 
integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress 
expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the 
individual's worth and dignity.”  
 
The self-fulfillment rationale, where speakers claim protection for the sheer pleasure 
of speaking, has an unseemly ring of hedonism, and has been extensively criticized by 
the works of Robert Bork.78 To ground freedom of speech in this theory indulges the 
individual in a right of self-gratification that legal systems have traditionally not been 
obliged to respect.79 Bork argues that if the protection of speech is linked to the 
pursuit of pleasure, then the state should be permitted to regulate speech in the same 
manner as it regulates other pleasure seeking activities, such as the consumption of 
                                                        
72 Carmi, above n 40, at 972. 
73 Carmi, above n 40, at 973.  
74 Carmi, above n 40, at 973.  
75 Carmi, above n 40, at 973. 
76 Edwin C. Baker “Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech” (1978) 25 UCLA L Rev 964 at 
966.  
77 Procunier v Martinez 416 US 396 (1974) at 416.  
78 Robert H. Bork “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems” (1971) 47 Ind L J 26.  
79 Rodney A. Smolla “Academic Freedom, Hate Speech and the Idea of a University” in William W. 
Van Alstyne Freedom and Tenure in the Academy (Duke University Press, London, 1993) at 199.  
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drugs or engaging the services of a prostitute.80 Though this comparison may seem 
extreme, it is exemplary of the state’s tendency to regulate conduct when the public 
interest so requires. There is a legitimate public interest in promoting social equality 
and preventing harm to victims of hate speech. Individual self-development and self-
fulfillment at the expense of another’s individual dignity and self-worth is not a viable 
rationale to defend free speech protection in the hate speech context. 
 
Each rationale canvassed above has fundamental flaws when assessed against the 
backdrop of hate speech. The fact that hate speech fails to accord with these free 
speech justifications raises questions as to the extent of protection it should be 
afforded, both in the United States and abroad. The Supreme Court case of Snyder v 
Phelps most recently affirmed United States commitment to the protection of hate 
speech. The reasoning and means of justification of both Chief Justice Roberts for the 
majority, and Justice Alito in dissent will be analyzed and critiqued in Part II of this 
paper.  
 
II  Snyder v Phelps  
 
A Introduction    
 
Snyder v Phelps involved a First Amendment battle that reached the Supreme Court 
on October 6th 2011. The Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment right of the 
Westboro Baptist Church and its members to picket the military funeral of Marine 
Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder. Though the 8-1 decision was not unexpected (in 
light of the constitutional setting and First Amendment precedents already canvassed) 
this does not detract from the cases constitutional importance. Some factual 
background, by way of introduction, is necessary.  
 
B The Westboro Baptist Church  
 
The Defendant, Pastor Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) in 
1955. Most of the Church’s congregation consists of Phelps’s extended family 
                                                        
80 Bork, above n 78; See also: Smolla, above n 79, at 199. 
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including his 13 children, 54 grandchildren and seven great grandchildren. 81  The 
Church subscribes to a very literal interpretation of the Bible, and believes that God is 
punishing the United States tolerance of homosexuality (particularly in the military) 
by killing soldiers at war as retribution for that tolerance.82 It has risen to infamy in 
recent years after adopting a new tactic of picketing the funerals of military service 
men in order to proselytize their views. Its messages are strongly homophobic, anti-
Semitic, anti-Catholic and hate driven.  
 
The Church orchestrates its protests strategically for maximum media exposure, 
targeting the mourners attending funerals in a uniquely distinctive way: The protest is 
directed at mourners not as a means to speak to them, but rather as a means to 
magnify the protestors audience for its public message.83 The media is irresistibly 
drawn to tragedy and the sight of persons visibly in grief, so the Church’s strategy, as 
Justice Alito commented, is one that “works”84 in its aim of gaining mass media 
attention. The Church has in the past exchanged free airtime on popular radio stations 
for the cancellation of intended funeral pickets. In 2006 the Church cancelled its 
threatened protest at the funeral of five Amish girls killed by a crazed gunman in 
exchange for publicity on a talk show.85 Margie Phelps, the daughter of Fred Phelps 
who is both a member of the Church and acts as the Church’s lawyer in legal disputes, 
has admitted that the key motivation behind its choice of funerals as protest grounds 
is the level of publicity it results in: “It’s how many ears we can reach. That is our 
job, that is our goal.”86 Essentially, the Church uses mourners as stage props, turning 
private funerals into tragic media spectacles.   
 
C Procedural History: The Path to the Supreme Court 
 
                                                        
81 Margaret Greco “Take a Step Back: The Constitutionality of Stricter Funeral Picketing Regulations 
after Snyder v Phelps” (2014) 23 B U Pub Int L J 151 at 151.  
82 John C Schoen and Edward J Schoen “Snyder v Phelps: A Cautiously Outrageous Protest” (2013) 23 
Southern L J 167 at 168.  
83 Alan Brownstein and Vikram David Amar “Death, Grief and Freedom of Speech: Does the First 
Amendment Permit Protection against Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral Mourners?”  (2010) 
1 Cardozo L Rev 368 at 380.  
84 Snyder v Phelps 131 US 1207 (2011) at [1224] per Alito J.  
85 At [1225] per Alito J.   
86 Nicole Santa Cruz and Seema Mehta “Westboro church agrees not to take protest to shooting victims 
funerals” Los Angeles Times (United States, 13 January 2011).  
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The father of deceased military service member Mathew Snyder brought action 
against the WBC and its members, succeeding in the lower courts on claims of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and invasion of privacy by intrusion 
upon seclusion. Picketers had displayed their signs for thirty minutes before the 
funeral began which stated: “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”; “Fags Doom Nations”; 
and “You’re going to Hell”.87 Snyder saw the signs when driving to the funeral (the 
drivers rerouted so as to avoid the display as much as possible) however did not learn 
of the signs content until watching the news that night. The Church also posted an 
online rant or “Epic” on their website after the physical protest which was found by 
Matthew Snyder’s parents when entering a Google search of his name.88 The Epic 
was not addressed in the Supreme Court for procedural reasons (a decision which did 
not escape criticism)89, however it made specific reference to the Snyder family, 
stating: 90   
 
“You raised him for the devil. Albert and Julie ripped that body apart and taught 
Matthew to defy his creator, to divorce and to commit adultery. They taught him 
how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire world, the 
Roman Catholic Monstrosity.”  
 
Following the filing of Snyder’s suit, the Church sought summary judgment 
requesting to dismiss the case outright on all causes of action citing its rights under 
the First Amendment. 91  The District Court dismissed the Snyder’s claim of 
defamation and publicity given to private life after oral arguments pre-trial. The 
remaining issues were determined by a jury who found for Snyder, and granted 8 
million dollars in punitive damages, and 2.9 million dollars in compensatory 
damages.92 Judge Bennett in the District Court for the District of Maryland affirmed 
the jury’s verdict, stating that the “First Amendment does not provide absolute 
                                                        
87 Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, at 1213.  
88 Christina Wells “Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v Phelps, Emotion and the First Amendment” 
(2010) 1 California L Rev 71 at 74. 
89 The writ of certiorari which the Snyder’s filed with the Supreme Court did not mention the epic: See 
Supreme Court Rules 14.1(g), Petition must contain setting out the facts material to consideration of 
the question presented; Jeffrey Shulman “Epic Considerations: The Speech that the Supreme Court 
Would Not Hear in Snyder v Phelps” (2011) Cardozo L Rev 35.   
90 Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, at 1226.   
91 Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, at 1214.  
92 Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, at 1214. 
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protection to individuals committing acts directed at other private individuals.”93 On 
appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals this decision was overturned, with an 
ultimate finding that WBC had engaged in protected speech and thus escaped liability.  
 
It is useful to canvas the reasoning and critiques of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision (a decision which one commentator stated is lacking in “precision or 
clarity”)94 prior to commenting on the decision of the Supreme Court. The Fourth 
Circuit decided that the issues raised by the WBC in protest, namely homosexuality in 
the military, sex abuse scandals within the Catholic Church and the moral conduct of 
the United States, were matters of “public concern.”95 Though this is undoubtedly 
correct, as was submitted by counsel for Snyder in the opening Brief to the Supreme 
Court, the Fourth Circuit erred in failing to find a rational connection between the 
“matters of public concern” identified above, and Snyder’s association to these 
issues. 96  The Fourth Circuit ought to have considered whether the connection to 
Matthew Snyder was of public concern, rather than the content of the speech itself.97  
 
In determining the public speech vs. private speech distinction, and how to correctly 
categorize the speech in question, the Court followed the lead of the Supreme Court 
decision of Hustler Magazine v Falwell. 98  Jeffery Shulman argues Hustler to be 
distinguishable on the basis of different actors, different speech, a different 
communicative setting and different underlying policy considerations.99 It is difficult 
to come to an alternative conclusion to Shulman, when one considers the different 
factual considerations at play in Hustler. Hustler magazine published a parody 
advertisement attacking well-known televangelist Jerry Falwell by implying he had 
lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse.100 The Court held that when a public 
figure brings an IIED claim based on speech, the First Amendment prevents 
                                                        
93 Snyder v Phelps et al 533 F Supp 2d 567 (D Md 2008). 
94 Jeffrey Shulman “Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability” 
(2010) Cardozo L Rev 1.  
95 Snyder v Phelps 580 F 3d 206 (4th Cir 2009) at 223.  
96 “Brief for Petitioner Albert Snyder” in the Supreme Court of the United States at 19, Snyder v 
Phelps, above n 84.   
97 Shulman, above n 94, at 2.  
98 Hustler Magazine v Falwell 485 US 46 (1988).  
99 Shulman, above n 94, at 2.  
100 Hustler Magazine v Falwell, above n 98, at 48.  
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recovery.101 Despite Snyder v Phelps involving a private figure who has not in any 
way sought the spotlight prior to bringing the claim, the Court determined the ratio in 
Hustler to be equally applicable. Shulman surmises:102  
 
“The Fourth Circuit failed to give these differences due weight, and took a step too 
far when it applied New York Times protection to speech undeserving of such 
constitutional solicitude.”   
 
The Fourth Circuit then determined that even if the speech was not of public concern, 
it was mere “rhetorical hyperbole”, thus it was not provably false and it was protected 
opinion.103 The Court appeared to be doctrinally borrowing concepts stemming from 
the law of defamation, which Shulman opines is not appropriate in a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 104  The Snyder’s submission on this 
submits that the Court’s reasoning turns “outrageousness” from a threshold element 
from the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress into an affirmative 
defense. 105  This creates a perverse incentive to be especially abusive and 
inflammatory as the more “hyperbolically hateful” the speech, the more constitutional 
protection it is afforded.106 This, according to Shulman, makes little sense when the 
plaintiff is bringing a claim on the grounds of emotional distress, as extreme 
rhetorical hyperbole is exactly the sort of speech that can act to heighten a plaintiff’s 
emotional distress.107  
 
Shulman acknowledged the difficulties the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals faced in 
dealing with fundamental colliding interests, given the “doctrinal funhouse” that made 
up United States constitutional law on speech-based tort claims.108 He concluded, 
however that it would be up to the Supreme Court to correct the failings of the lower 
Court and ensure a better balance is struck between the need to protect robust political 
debate and the need to protect individuals from personal abuse and hate speech.   
 
                                                        
101 Hustler Magazine v Falwell, above n 98, at 56.  
102 Shulman, above n 94, at 2.  
103 Snyder v Phelps, above n 95.   
104 Schulman, above n 94, at 3.  
105 “Brief for Petitioner Albert Snyder”, above n 96, at 20.   
106 Shulman, above n 94, at 3.  
107 Shulman, above n 94, at 3.  
108 Schulman, above n 94, at 1.  
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D Chief Justice Roberts  
 
Chief Justice Roberts (Roberts CJ) wrote for the majority and, like the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, framed the central issue as being whether the speech in question 
was public (code for ‘protected’) speech.109 Speech on public issues “occupies the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”110 and is therefore rarely 
amenable to exception. The case law on when speech constitutes a matter of public 
concern, or pushes the speech into the ‘public speech’ category suggests hate speech 
is encompassed by this. Roberts CJ cites Rankin v McPherson 111  which held a 
statement’s arguably “inappropriate or controversial character… is irrelevant to the 
question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.”112 If the speech falls within 
the ‘public speech’ ambit, the First Amendment is capable of serving as an almost 
infallible defense to Snyder’s claim of tort liability. 113  Instead of first assessing 
whether the Plaintiff’s tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
made out, and then proceeding to assess the defenses available to the Church, Roberts 
CJ used the First Amendment as the starting point from which to base his assessment.  
 
In determining whether the speech was of public concern, Roberts CJ assessed the 
“content, form and context of that speech” as revealed by all the circumstances.114 
The Court determined that the content of Westboro’s signs “plainly related to broad 
issues of interest to society at large.”115 While Roberts CJ conceded that a few of the 
signs contained messages related to the particular individual,116 the dominant thrust of 
the speech highlighted issues of public import, such as homosexuality in the military 
and the general fate of the nation.117 It was held that the funeral context and the 
connection with Matthew Snyder’s funeral could not change the nature of the speech 
to something unprotected and open to tort liability.118  The Court instead framed the 
“context” as speech that was merely expressed in a “public place adjacent to a public 
                                                        
109 Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, at 1211. 
110 Connick v Myers 461 US 138 (1983). 
111 At [1211] per Roberts CJ.  
112 At [1211] per Roberts CJ. 
113 At [1211] per Roberts CJ.  
114 At [1216] per Roberts CJ. 
115 At [1216] per Roberts CJ.  
116 At [1217] per Roberts CJ.  
117 At [1217] per Roberts CJ. 
118 At [1217] per Roberts CJ.  
FREEDOM OF HATE SPEECH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, SNYDER V PHELPS AND BEYOND.  
 24 
street”119 which somewhat ignores the precise facts at issue and the proximity to the 
funeral procession. As public streets and public places have historically been the 
“archetype of a traditional public forum” 120  framing the context in this way 
significantly undermined any chances of the Snyder’s claim succeeding. Roberts CJ 
concluded that:121  
 
“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern 
that speech is entitled to special protection under the First Amendment. Such 
speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”  
 
The conclusion drawn by Roberts CJ is somewhat flawed when one takes into 
consideration the following factors: The way in which the Court framed the “context” 
of the speech, the Court’s concession that some of the speech’s content was aimed at 
the Snyders specifically and thus were private messages, and the fact that the 
boundaries between public speech and private speech have been notoriously unclear 
and often difficult to define and apply.122 Furthermore, the Court only considered the 
contents of the Westboro Church’s placards and declined to consider the “Epic” 
posted on its website (sections of which have been referred to and reproduced above). 
The epic can only be described as a personal attack on the Snyders and containing 
speech that was on matters of purely private concern. Therefore, in making the 
determination that the speech related to matters of public import, the Court failed to 
address the parts of the Church’s speech that was a clear verbal assault on the 
Snyders.123 An assessment of the content, form and context of the speech “as revealed 
by the whole record”124 was therefore not undertaken.125  
 
The distinction made by Roberts CJ between private speech, public speech and public 
speech intermingled with private speech has been subject to valid criticism, both by 
commentators, and by Alito J in dissent.126 There is an arbitrary distinction between 
the latter two categories, both of which the Court have classed as protected First 
                                                        
119 At [1218] per Roberts CJ.  
120 At [1217] per Roberts CJ. 
121 At [1219] per Roberts CJ.  
122 At [1216] per Roberts CJ.  
123 Shulman, above n 89, at 36.  
124 At [1216] per Roberts CJ.  
125 Shulman, above n 89, at 36.  
126 Shulman, above n 94, at 313; See also Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, at [1228] per Alito J.  
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Amendment speech. Purely private speech is not immune to regulation. Justice Powell 
has noted that if we had a constitutional order that held otherwise “a woman of 
impeccable character who was branded a whore by a jealous neighbour would have 
no effective legal recourse.” 127  Schulman poses a variation on this, where the 
neighbor instead proclaims outside the Church in which the woman attends Sunday 
mass: “This woman, like all Catholics, is a whore.”128 The harm inflicted upon the 
woman remains the same in both scenarios. Is the speech protected because though a 
private person is targeted it purports to address a matter of public concern? Roberts 
CJ approach of assessing the “dominant thrust” of the speech would suggest this to be 
the case, which appears to be a concerning precedent to set. Alito J further highlighted 
these difficulties, in which he failed to see why actionable speech should be 
immunized “simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected.”129  His 
opinion is commented on below.  
 
E Justice Alito in Dissent  
 
Justice Alito provided an emotive and ardent dissent, opening his judgment with the 
statement: “Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a 
license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.” 130  Unlike the 
reasoning of the majority, Alito J began by assessing the elements of the tort of 
intentional infliction of distress, which he found to be made out, and then assessed 
this against the value and category of the speech in question. He reasoned that the tort 
of IIED is already extremely narrow, and will be reserved to a limited class of cases 
where the wounds are “truly severe” and “incapable of healing themselves.”131 For the 
tort of IIED to succeed, Snyder needs to show that the Church’s intentional conduct 
was so extreme and so outrageous as to “go beyond all possible bounds of decency 
and to be regarded as… utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”132 The speech 
needs to be shown to have caused Snyder to suffer severe emotional distress.133  
Snyder testified to the harm he has suffered as a result of Westboro’s actions: He 
                                                        
127 Shulman, above n 94, at 313.  
128 Shulman, above n 94, at 313. 
129 At [1227] per Alito J.  
130 At [1222] per Alito J.  
131 At [1222] per Alito J.  
132 At [1222] per Alito J.  
133 At [1222] per Alito J.  
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stated that he was unable to separate the thought of his dead son from his thoughts of 
Westboro’s picketing, and that he often becomes tearful, angry and physically ill 
when he thinks about it. 134   Alito J considered the elements of the tort of IIED 
satisfied.  
 
The Church in its submissions did not dispute that the tort of IIED was not made 
out.135 They instead contended that the First Amendment gave them a right to engage 
in such conduct.136 Alito J rebutted this outright, and unequivocally stated that the 
Church, in this regard, “are wrong.”137 On deciding the question of whether the First 
Amendment precluded tort liability he assessed the value of the speech and whether it 
can properly be characterized as ‘public speech’ in line with the reasoning of the 
majority. He held the speech in question made no contribution to public debate,138 and 
cites the Courts proposition in Chaplinski v. New Hampshire. 139  The Court in 
Chaplinksi stated that the First Amendment does not shield utterances which form “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas.” 140   While this statement was made in 
reference to the Courts creation of the ‘fighting words’ principle, it is nonetheless 
indicative of the Courts readiness to limit speech when it is of low value, and does not 
serve as a suggestion that Alito J considers the fighting words exception to require 
extension beyond its current scope.  
 
Fundamental to Alito J’s reasoning is the category of speech he attributes to the 
Church’s demonstration. In assessing this question he considers the analysis of the 
majority as superficial in the respect that it did not address the “Epic” which acts as 
clear evidence of the Church’s intent, and reaffirms the meaning of the Church’s 
protest.141 He considered the epic and the funeral protest to be part of a single course 
of conduct, requiring a cumulative examination.142  In determining that the speech 
was beyond the realms of “commentary on public concern”, and thus not worthy of 
the fullest First Amendment protection, he based his decision on a number of factors. 
                                                        
134 At [1214] per Roberts CJ. 
135 At [1222] per Alito J.  
136 At [1222] per Alito J.  
137 At [1222] per Alito J.  
138 At [1222] per Alito J.  
139 Chaplinski v. New Hampshire 315 US 568 (1942).  
140 At [1223] per Alito J.  
141 At [1226] per Alito J.  
142 At [1226] per Alito J.  
FREEDOM OF HATE SPEECH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, SNYDER V PHELPS AND BEYOND.  
 27 
Firstly, the choice of protest venue in close proximity to Matthew Snyder’s funeral 
meant that a reasonable person would have interpreted the signs as being connected to 
Matthew Snyder.143 Secondly, a consideration of both the Epic and at least some of 
the signs at the funeral demonstrations indicated the intended nature of the speech to 
be a specific attack on Matthew Snyder and the Snyder family. 144  Thirdly, both 
Matthew Snyder and the Plaintiff were private figures.145   
 
Thus, Alito J concludes that while “commentary on the Catholic Church or the United 
States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding 
Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct does not.”146 He instead frames the speech 
as a personal attack and personal abuse which “is not in any proper sense 
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.” 147  In 
characterizing the protest as a verbal attack on Snyder, Alito J analogized Phelps to an 
assailant who physically attacks a random victim, knowing that his assault will be 
newsworthy as a deliberate strategy to amplify his public message.148 Alito J argues 
neither the physical assault, nor the verbal assault is worthy of constitutional 
protection and just as a physical assault can occur on a public street, so too can 
IIED.149   
 
Justice Alito’s dissent does not, by any stretch, go as far as to attempt to argue for a 
categorical exception to the First Amendment in the case of hate speech. The phrase 
“hate speech” does not even appear in Alito J’s judgment. According to Alito J, this is 
simply a brutal, personal attack on the Snyder family to which the tort of IIED should 
extend. He expressly states that the Church’s opportunities to undertake their hateful 
tirades are almost limitless: “They could have picketed the United States Capitol, the 
White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, or any of the more than 5,600 
military recruiting stations in this country.”150 His key concern was the funeral setting 
                                                        
143 At [1226] per Alito J.  
144 At [1226] per Alito J.  
145 At [1226] per Alito J.  
146 At [1226] per Alito J.  
147 At [1222] per Alito J.  
148 At [1227] per Alito J; Michael Bakhama “Building Picket Fences: Maryland’s Funeral Picketing 
Law After Snyder v Phelps” (2012) 71 Md L Rev 1231 at 1241.  
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as a time of intense emotional sensitivities, adding to the viciousness of the attack and 
the unique level of harm at play. He holds that:151  
 
“Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace with harassment does not 
undermine public debate… In this setting the First Amendment permits a private 
figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech 
on a matter of private concern.”152  
 
By very much limiting IIED protection to the specific factual context, Alito J is 
ensuring the floodgates to wide ranging speech based tort liability are not opened. As 
the WBC is the only organization to utilize the tactic of picketing funerals in the 
United States, and this is largely what Alito J considers synonymous with “outrageous 
or extreme” conduct for the purposes of satisfying the elements of the tort of IIED,153 
allowing the Snyders to succeed on their claim would only hinder or have a chilling 
effect upon the future conduct of the WBC. The Church’s activities were expressed 
by Roberts CJ as “hurtful and [their] contribution to public discourse … 
negligible.”154 Given these findings, and the fact that only a very limited portion of 
public debate would be stifled when the requisite level of harm can be proven under 
the tort of IIED, it is surprising the Majority did not take a stand and utilize the tort as 
a means of circumventing the First Amendment. The majority’s refusal to do so only 
acts to further indicate the high levels of protection given to speech in the United 
States, and affirms the position of hate speech as remaining within the realm of 
protected speech subject to few regulatory constraints.   
 
F Post Snyder v Phelps: Academic Reception  
 
Academic discourse within the United States generally favors the view that the 
Supreme Court came to the correct decision in finding the First Amendment extended 
to protect the speech of the WBC. Christina Wells stated that to find otherwise would 
undo decades of the Courts’ jurisprudence protecting “offensive speech”. 155  The 
Courts’ free speech jurisprudence, as canvassed in the previous section of this paper, 
                                                        
151 At [1228] per Alito J.  
152 At [1228] per Alito J.  
153 At [1229] per Alito J.  
154 At [1220] per Roberts CJ.  
155 Wells, above n 88, at 72.  
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does not allow government sanctioned punishment of speech based on content or 
opinions. Additional objective indications of harm are generally required, such as 
speech accompanied by physical invasions, threats or violence.156 Wells argues that 
the Courts protection of “offensive speech” is based on two premises: Firstly speech 
of public concern retains its value even when delivered in an offensive manner; and 
secondly any attempts to punish offensive speech can often lead to censorship of 
unpopular ideas.157 She states that Snyder v Phelps “implicates the Courts’ offensive 
speech jurisprudence in its purest sense.”158  
 
However, the flaw in Wells’ argument lies in her mischaracterization of the speech at 
issue in Snyder as speech that merely “offends”. There are obvious issues in 
regulating against solely offensive speech (which this paper will explore further when 
it assesses international regulatory approaches to hate speech), however the speech 
the WBC was professing both online and in connection to the funeral was speech that 
professed hate. It is difficult to see how statements which revel in the deaths of 
soldiers, and attribute the downfall of America to the tolerance of homosexuality, can 
be classed as anything otherwise. The speech in Snyder v Phelps is not just unpopular 
opinion, which is “outside mainstream thought.”159 It is hate speech, pure and simple. 
The distinction between hate speech and offensive speech is an important one to 
draw, and one that has not garnered a lot of attention in United States First 
Amendment jurisprudence.160  
 
Christina Wells strongly opposes the extension of tort liability to cover this sort of 
speech. She states that the very nature of IIED and the “outrageousness” requirement 
encourages lawsuits when plaintiffs are insulted by the defendant’s speech.161 The 
Court has never allowed punishment for speech on the basis of the apparent invalidity 
of conflicting beliefs. 162  She posits that tort liability in particular is especially 
inapplicable in this context, as unlike generally applicable criminal laws that clearly 
                                                        
156 Wells, above n 88, at 72.  
157 Wells, above n 88, at 75.  
158 Wells, above n 88, at 75.  
159 Wells, above n 88, at 76.  
160 See, for example, Part III of this Paper which will further expand on the importance of the 
distinction between hate speech and offensive speech at pp 40, 45, 46.    
161 Wells, above n 88, at 84.  
162 Wells, above n 88, at 84. 
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indicate what behavior is unlawful, tort lawsuits involve private disputes between 
discrete parties.163 Therefore, she concludes that if the Court were to have held the 
Phelpses liable in Snyder, this would have been synonymous to allowing censorship 
of speech based on its unpopular message, via a censorship mechanism that is both 
wholly inappropriate and fundamentally at odds with First Amendment 
jurisprudence.164  
 
Conversely, some observers argue that the emotional impact of the speech, and the 
harm at issue is the exact reason why tort liability should extend to this sort of 
scenario.165 These claims centre around the arguments already outlined, namely that 
the First Amendment should not interfere with “the use of words as weapons” and 
robust public discourse will not be chilled by allowing tort liability in cases of hate 
speech.166 Schulman argues that the availability of tort remedies for injurious speech 
is critical if private individuals are to peacefully exercise their own constitutional 
rights, especially given the lack of criminal regulation.167 Why should the private 
plaintiff be left defenseless against emotionally injurious speech that serves no valid 
communicative purpose? Shulman posits that the state has a substantial interest in 
protecting families’ “personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead” and in 
keeping their most intimate moments from “unwarranted public exploitation.” 168 
Given this substantial state interest, Shulman argues Mr. Snyder should have the 
opportunity to show the tort of IIED is made out. As Wells admits, the intent 
requirement of the tort limits liability to the “worst actors”,169 which should serve to 
quell concerns regarding chilling effects on speech. The state interest is further 
exemplified by the funeral picketing regulations enacted in forty states as a direct 
result of the activities of WBC. 170  Although, Alito J observed that the regulations do 
                                                        
163 Wells, above n 88, at 73.  
164 Wells, above n 88, at 73.  
165 Shulman, above n 94.  
166  Shulman above n 94, at 336; Chelsea Brown “Not Your Mother’s Remedy: A Civil Action 
Response to the Westboro Church’s Military Funeral Demonstrations” (2009) 112 W Va L Rev 207 at 
232.  
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168 Shulman, above n 94, at 3.  
169 Wells, above n 88, at 84.  
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not obviate the need for IIED protection,171 they illustrate the unique and significant 
public interest at play in this context.    
 
G State Regulations on Funeral Picketing 
 
In order for funeral picketing regulations to be constitutionally compliant, they can 
only regulate the “time, place and manner” of the activity, and cannot be aimed at the 
content. 172  The majority judgment in Snyder v Phelps suggested that the 
implementation of these new laws would prevent or at least mitigate the wounds 
inflicted by these verbal assaults at funerals.173 However WBC’s picketing would 
have been in full compliance with the Maryland regulation that was enacted in 
response to the Church’s protest as it prohibited picketing within 100 feet of a funeral 
service or funeral procession.174  The Church’s protest took place outside of this 
“buffer zone” on a plot of public land located about 1000 feet from the funeral site.175 
Justice Alito concluded that the regulations are significant only to the extent that they 
are evidence of societies interest in preserving the sanctity and privacy of funerals, 
but as is evident in Snyder v Phelps itself, they fall short of remedying the harm at 
issue.176 An assessment of the means by which states are attempting to address the 
issue of the conduct of the WBC, while nevertheless staying true to established First 
Amendment jurisprudence, is further evidence of the difficulties the United States 
treatment of the First Amendment poses in a situation where there is a legitimate 
public interest in hindering the expression.  
 
There are long established Supreme Court precedents holding the right to freedom of 
speech is capable of being subject to reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions. 177  In determining a regulation’s constitutionality, the first focus is 
whether the regulation is content-neutral.178 The enactment of the regulation cannot 
                                                        
171 Snyder v Phelps, above n 84, per Alito at [1228].  
172 Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence 468 US 288 (1984).  
173 At [1227] per Alito J.  
174 Crimes Against Public Health, Conduct and Sensibilities Md Code Ann Crim Law § 10-205.  
175 Bakhama, above n 148, at1232.  
176 At [1227] per Alito J.  
177 Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence 468 US 288 (1984) at 295; Tinker v Des Moines 
Independent Community School District 393 US 503 (1969); Ward v Rock Against Racism 491 US 781 
(1989).  
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have been triggered by the content of the speech but by another, external indicator, 
and any burden thereby placed on freedom of expression may only be incidental. The 
Supreme Court has stated that a statute is content-neutral if its “restrictions apply 
equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint and the statutory language 
makes no reference to the content of the speech.”179 A content-neutral restriction is 
subject to an ‘intermediate scrutiny’ test by the Courts which means the restriction 
must serve a significant government interest; be narrowly tailored; and permit for 
alternative channels of communication. 180  The regulation must be as minimal a 
restriction on freedom of expression as required to advance the state interest in 
question.181  As they are a fairly recent phenomenon in the specific context of funeral 
demonstrations, the constitutionality of many of these state laws is still being 
determined.182  
 
While the Supreme Court has not yet made a ruling on the regulations, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld Ohio’s funeral protest law in Phelps–Roper v 
Strickland183 as a content-neutral measure narrowly tailored to serve a significant state 
interest in protecting funeral mourners’ privacy. The regulation in question restricted 
protesting activities to a 300 feet buffer zone that could not take place one hour before 
or after the funeral procession. 184  In making this determination, the Sixth Circuit 
relied on Supreme Court pronouncements on the issue of time, manner and place 
restrictions generally.185 The Supreme Court has specifically held that a city could ban 
intrusive residential picketing in order to protect residential privacy,186 and that a state 
could restrict speakers from approaching non-consenting individuals entering a 
medical facility.187  
 
In the context of residential picketing, it was held that individuals in their home are 
captive audiences to unwanted communication, and “there is simply no right to force 
                                                        
179 Hill v Colorado 530 US 703 (2000) at 719.  
180 Clark v Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, above n 177, at 293; Ward v Rock against Racism, above n 
177, at 791.  
181 Clark v Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, above n 177.  
182 See, for example, Phelps-Roper v City of Manchester 697 F 3d 678 (8th Cir 2012).  
183 Phelps-Roper v Strickland 539 F 3d 356 (6th Cir 2008).  
184 Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3767.30 (West 2006).  
185 See, for example, Frisby v Shultz 487 US 474 (1988); Hill v Colorado, above n 179; Madsen v 
Women’s Health Center, Inc 512 US 753 (1994).  
186 Frisby v Schultz, above n 185, at 484.   
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speech into the home of an unwilling listener.”188 In the context of medical clinics, it 
was held that the regulation served a significant and legitimate government interest in 
providing unimpeded access to health care and avoiding potential trauma to patients 
who are often in “particularly vulnerable physical and emotional conditions.”189 In 
concluding that Ohio has an important interest in the protection of funeral attendees, 
the Sixth Circuit made analogies to both these Supreme Court authorities and 
stated:190  
 
Just as a resident subjected to picketing is “left with no means of avoiding the 
unwanted speech” mourners cannot easily avoid unwanted protests without 
sacrificing their right to partake in the funeral or burial service. And just as “persons 
who attempt to enter health care facilities are often in particularly vulnerable 
physical and emotional conditions” it goes without saying that funeral attendees are 
also emotionally vulnerable.  
 
By contrast, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a similar funeral protest 
ordinance under the First Amendment in Phelps-Roper v City of Manchester191 failing 
to find any significant government interest in the protection of funeral attendees. The 
ordinance contained the same restrictions as in Strickland.192 The Court was brief in 
its opinion, and has left the question of the constitutionality of funeral picketing 
regulations as largely unanswered, with two Appellate level courts differing in their 
position on essentially the same statute.  It is therefore a question that requires a 
conclusive determination by the Supreme Court. Considering that members of the 
WBC have to date been extremely zealous in commencing legal proceedings in the 
name of their First Amendment rights, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court will 
have ample opportunity to determine this question shortly.   
 
It is interesting to note that the only two Court of Appeal cases to determine the issue 
of the constitutionality of funeral picketing regulations have been brought by 
members of the WBC. This further reinforces the fact that regulation of this speech, 
whether through expansion of the tort of IIED or through the more First Amendment 
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consonant mechanism of time, manner and place restrictions, largely only constrains 
members of the WBC. Given that the Church has been termed by the Southern 
Poverty Law Centre as “the most obnoxious and rabid hate group in America”193 
curbing or restraining their activities in the name of human dignity and freedom from 
discrimination should not appear groundbreaking.  
 
H  Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the position of “hate speech” in the United States has remained outside 
the regulatory reach of the state via tort liability, and the constitutionality of time, 
manner and place restrictions is a question that remains to be authoritatively decided 
upon.  Alito J in dissent ardently argued for tort liability to extend to this context, but 
his reasoning limited the extension of the tort of IIED to the precise facts at issue, 
which does little to advance the case for wider hate speech regulation in the United 
States. The reasons for the United States aversion against any kind of censorship or 
regulation in this context is largely based on fears surrounding the ‘chilling effect’ on 
speech, and slippery slope concerns. Part III, the final part of this paper will adopt a 
comparative approach, and assess the position in three politically congenial states 
where regulatory mechanisms have been adopted by the Legislature. The comparative 
approach is adopted to provide some insight into the constitutional invincibility of 
hate speech in the United States, and to demonstrate that the ‘slippery slope’ fears in 
regulating speech based on content may not be as real as they appear.  
 
III  International Experiences in the Regulation of Hate Speech  
 
A Introduction  
 
This paper will now seek to examine the mechanisms and definitions the three states 
of Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand have adopted to curb the 
proliferation of hate propaganda domestically. Although there is some common 
ground across the three countries on the approaches adopted, Luke McNamara notes 
there are significant differences in terms of the manifestations of these values in legal 
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form.194 Unlike the United States, the three comparator countries have ratified the 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 
which contains specific obligations in Article 4 to legislate against hate 
propaganda. 195  It obliges parties to adopt “immediate and positive measures” to 
eradicate forms of incitement and discrimination that is based on the idea of racial 
supremacy.196  
 
The extent to which these obligations are met in each state, and the extent to which 
these state’s balanced their obligation under ICERD against the competing right to 
freedom of expression will be assessed, against the background of each state’s unique 
constitutional setting. The notion of ‘balancing’ competing rights is from the outset in 
stark contrast to the “anti-balancing” approach that is typical of the United States. 
Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme Court epitomized this in his 
statement in Konigsberg v State Bar, where he held that the First Amendment’s 
“unequivocal command… shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all 
the “balancing” that was to be done in this field.”197 As this Paper has demonstrated, 
regulation in the United States has thus far only been held to be legitimate when it is 
balanced against a non-speech element. It is evident therefore that the United States 




Canada has been described as “the most enthusiastic consumer of hate propaganda 
norms in the international community” 198 in terms of its implementation of its treaty 
obligations under ICERD, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It has an 
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extensive array of hate speech legislation on the statute books, located both in the 
Criminal Code and in provincial human rights instruments.  
 
Canada’s main approach to combatting hate speech has been through the use of 
criminal sanctions. This stems back to recommendations made in the Cohen Report, 
released in 1966 at a time when neo-Nazi activity and white supremacist 
organizations were considered to be on the rise.199 They were feared to be leading 
Canada towards “a climate of malice, destructive to the central values of Judaeo-
Christian Society.”200 Though the activities of these organizations were limited and 
ineffective, the Committee concluded that hate propaganda could lead to a wider 
societal breakdown and needed to be suppressed through criminal prohibition.201 The 
criminalization of hate speech was therefore the primary regulatory approach 
considered, and Parliament accepted and enacted these recommendations in 1970 via 
amendments to the Criminal Code of Canada.202  
 
1 The Criminal Code of Canada 
 
Sections 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada are the primary hate speech 
provisions. Section 318 outlaws the advocacy of genocide.203 Section 319(1) outlaws 
the incitement of hatred against an identifiable group likely to lead to a breach of the 
peace. 204  Section 319(2) outlaws the willful promotion of hatred against an 
identifiable group, regardless of the effect of the behavior, so long as the requisite 
level of intention is present.205 Inciting or willfully promoting hatred carries a two-
year maximum penalty, while advocating genocide carries a five-year maximum 
penalty.206 In 2004, the meaning of identifiable group was amended to include a group 
identified on the basis of their sexual orientation.207 Section 319(3) provides defenses 
to a charge of willful promotion of hatred under s 319(2), lessening the incursions into 
countervailing free speech rights. A defendant can either raise the defense of truth, 
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religious opinion being expressed in good faith, or can show the subject matter was 
both in the public interest, in the public benefit and in circumstances where the 
defendant had reasonable grounds in believing the truth of the statements.208   
 
The constitutional validity of s 319 (the “hate speech laws”) is a question that has 
long been settled by the Courts. 209  Much like the United States, the Canadian 
Supreme Court can strike down provincial and federal legislation on grounds of 
Charter incompatibility. Section 1 of the Charter however, confers upon the Courts 
wider powers and greater flexibility than is available to the United States Supreme 
Court. It allows Courts to uphold the validity of the legislation if it can be 
demonstrably justified.210 In 1990 a Supreme Court majority in R v Keegstra held s 
319(2) of the Criminal Code to be a demonstrably justified limitation on citizen’s 
right to freedom of expression, using the test formulated in R v Oakes:211  
 
Section 319(2) of the Code constitutes a reasonable limit upon freedom of 
expression.  Parliament's objective of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda is 
of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional freedom.  Parliament has 
recognized the substantial harm that can flow from hate propaganda and, in trying to 
prevent the pain suffered by target group members and to reduce racial, ethnic and 
religious tension and perhaps even violence in Canada, has decided to suppress the 
wilful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups. 
 
Hate speech was characterized by the Supreme Court as having only a “tenuous 
connection… with s 2(b) values.”212 Despite the narrow margin by which this provision 
was upheld as constitutional, the Supreme Court has shown no inclination thus far to 
revisit the question of validity.213  
 
2 Human Rights Statutes  
 
(a) The Federal Human Rights Act  
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Canada’s human rights legislation exists on both federal and provincial levels. There 
are 13 provincial human rights statutes (for each province and territory) and a Federal 
Human Rights Act. Section 13 of the Federal Human Rights Act acted as the relevant 
“hate speech provision”, banning hate speech transmitted over the telephone.214 It 
held that it was a discriminatory practice for a person or group of persons acting in 
concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated by means 
of telecommunication facilities any matter likely to expose a person or persons to 
hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person is identifiable on the basis of 
a prohibited ground of discrimination. 215  The mode of telecommunication was 
specifically legislated against due to the emerging presence of private hate lines at the 
time of the provisions enactment. The immediate impetus was a hate line operated by 
the Western Guard in Toronto by white supremacist leader John Ross Taylor.216 The 
hate line operated so that members of the public who dialed an advertised number 
would hear a prerecorded hate message. Due to speech being private conversations to 
which s 319 did not extend, there appeared a lacuna in the law arguably remedied by 
the implementation of s 13.217 
 
John Taylor was the first to be successfully prosecuted under s 13, in which the 
Supreme Court held s 13 to constitute a justifiable limitation under s 1 of the 
Charter.218 However since the Taylor decision in 1990, Parliament has extended the 
scope of the section by applying it to communications transmitted over the Internet.219 
In light of Parliament’s extensions, the Human Rights Tribunal has stated that it was 
unlikely the provision would withstand a further round of constitutional scrutiny.220 
This led to a nationwide debate as to whether s 13 should remain, or whether it was 
restricting Canadian’s free speech rights to the extent that it necessitated repeal. The 
Canadian Bar Association opposed its repeal, stating in its submission that the social 
evil of promoting hatred had not diminished and the emergence of new mediums like 
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the Internet ensured its promulgation has become more widespread.221 The sanctions 
for breaching s 13 were far less serious than a conviction under s 319, and Tribunals 
most commonly used remedial mechanism was a cease and desist order. The 
Association submitted this remedy should be retained, and any punitive provisions 
Parliament has enacted be eradicated, as the overarching purpose was to promote 
equality and eliminate discrimination which could be effectively achieved by cease 
and desist orders.222  
 
However, the arguments for the sections repeal were abundant. Critics of the section 
had a major distrust in the Human Rights Tribunals (or “kangaroo courts”) within 
which s 13 claims were being heard.223 Alberta Conservative MP Brian Storseth who 
introduced the private members bill calling for the section’s removal, called the 
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal “a quasi-judicial, secretive body that takes away 
your natural rights as a Canadian.”224 It was also argued that the section would be too 
difficult to enforce against material published and disseminated on the Internet, and 
the lack of intent or foreseeability required by the provision broadened the scope of 
the section so that it included communication that ought not to be prohibited.225 This 
point was expressly countered by Dickson CJ in Taylor who stated:  
 
“The preoccupation with effects and not with intent is readily explicable when one 
considers that systemic discrimination is much more widespread in our society than 
is intentional discrimination. To import a subjective intent requirement into human 
rights provisions rather than allowing tribunals to focus solely on effects would thus 
defeat one of the primary goals of anti-discrimination statutes.”226 
 
Ultimately, the criticisms were grounded in the idea that the section was over 
inclusive to the extent that it no longer operated as a shield to protect civil liberties, 
but as a sword to attack free speech rights. The section was repealed in 2013, 
removing the authority of the Human Rights Commission to investigate online hate 
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speech and request that violating websites be taken down.227 Free speech defenders 
hailed the repeal a victory, but with the ever-growing emergence of “keyboard 
warriors”228 the repeal is likely to result in a real and identifiable gap in the law to 
which a legal remedy ought to extend.   
 
(b)  Provincial human rights statutes 
 
Provincial human rights statutes’ hate speech provisions have however remained on 
the statute books. Section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code is 
illustrative of a typical provision banning hate propaganda:  
 
No person shall publish or display… representation that exposes or tends to expose 
to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class 
of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground.  
 
The Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of the Saskatchewan provision in 
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott.229 Bill Whatcott was charged 
with promoting hate under this section after he distributed flyers expressing his strong 
religious convictions against homosexuals. 230  The Court found that the provincial 
rules against hate speech were limitations prescribed by law within the meaning of s 1 
of the Charter of Rights, and were demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.  It concluded however that the part of the section that “ ‘ridicules, belittles, or 
otherwise affronts the dignity of’ did not rise to the level of ardent and extreme 
feelings constituting hatred required to uphold the constitutionality of a prohibition of 
freedom of expression in human rights legislation.”231 The Court therefore struck 
those words from the Saskatchewan provision.  
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In making the distinction between merely offending someone and actively promoting 
hatred, the Court relied on its earlier decision in Taylor where “hatred” (in reference 
to the now repealed s 13) was defined as follows:232  
 
The phrase "hatred or contempt" … refers only to unusually strong and deep‑felt 
emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification and, as long as human rights 
tribunals continue to be well aware of the purpose … and pay heed to the ardent and 
extreme nature of feeling described in that phrase, there is little danger that subjective 
opinion as to offensiveness will supplant the proper meaning of the section.  
 
While the lines of separation between being very offensive versus likely promoting 
hatred are not obvious ones, clear guidance by the Courts should act to ameliorate 
these concerns. Provincial Human Rights Tribunals have been guided by the decision 
in Taylor and narrowly interpret relevant statutes, to ensure only extreme expression 
that is hateful or contemptuous in character falls within the regulatory ambit of the 
state.233 Whatcott confirmed that hate speech prohibitions require purely objective 
determinations of whether a reasonable person would view the speech as exposing the 




While the validity of hate speech laws in the post 1990 environment is for the most 
part a non-issue in Canada, implementation problems remain.235 Firstly, human rights 
statutes do not require proof of actual harm, often merely requiring speech which has 
the tendency produce the harm, leaving Tribunals guessing as to what statements are 
likely to have that effect. 236  However, legislating against conduct which has the 
tendency of exposing groups to hatred is important as it goes to the heart of the 
“second order harms” discussed in Part I, and avoids wider societal harms like the 
exacerbation of inequalities and the general destabilization of society.  
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A second possible concern in the Canadian system is that defenses built in to the 
criminal regime are not available to a respondent in a human rights claim.237 This may 
strengthen the argument that the criminal law is a more appropriate mode of 
intervention as it is a lesser of two evils in terms of the incursions it makes upon free 
speech rights. Dickson CJ furthered this position in Keegstra where he considered 
hate speech to be too loud and too dominant in public discourse, thus requiring the 
more confrontational response of the criminal law.238 However statistics show that the 
criminal response is one which is seldom utilized - In the first twenty years of hate 
speech laws being in the Criminal Code there were only six prosecutions.239 This may 
be attributable to the requirement of the consent of the Attorney-General for 
prosecution, and the high burden of proof under the Criminal Code. The impact on 
both free speech rights and individuals who would seek recourse under this statute is 
therefore fairly minimal.   
 
 
C The United Kingdom  
 
Like Canada, the United Kingdom has dealt with hate speech by criminalizing the 
conduct, but diverges from the Canadian approach by not adopting civil prohibitions 
in addition to criminal intervention.240 The relevant offence was initially located in the 
Race Relations Act 1965, and carried a two-year maximum sentence. 241  It was 
designed to “prevent the stirring up of racial hatred which may beget violence and 
public disorder”242, but has never contained a breach of the peace component as 
appears in the Canadian Criminal Code.  
 
1 The Public Order Act 1986 
 
(a) Inciting hatred  
 
                                                        
237 Criminal Code, above n 203, s 319 (3).  
238 R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. 
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Racial hatred is now dealt with in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. Section 18(1) 
states that: 
 
A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior, or displays 
any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an 
offence if –  
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or 
(b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby.  
 
This provision creates an either/or approach to whether the offence should be defined 
in terms of subjective intent or the objectively assessed likely effect. While intention 
to incite religious hatred is not a requirement under the Act, s 18(5) provides that a 
defendant needs to intend, or be aware that, his words or behavior might be 
threatening, abusive or insulting. 243  The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
extended this offence to cover religious hatred, and the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 added the offence of inciting hatred on the basis of sexual 
orientation.244  
 
Due to a significant media and political campaign against the Religious Hatred Bill 
2005,245  the Government accepted a different form of provision to that of racial 
hatred.246 The requirement of intention to incite religious hatred was included, which 
is in stark contrast to the either/or approach of s 18. Intention requirements were also 
included in the offence of inciting hatred on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Opponents to the differing approaches have said the inclusion of intention 
requirements render the provisions almost unenforceable.247 Kay Goodall writes that 
“without a confession it will be very difficult to prove purpose intention… The Lords 
                                                        
243 Public Order Act 1986 (UK), s 18(5).  
244 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK); Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK).  
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News (United Kingdom, 7 December 2004); BBC News “New effort to ban religious hate” BBC News 
(United Kingdom, 11 June 2005).  
246 Helen Fenwick Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th ed, Routledge Cavendish, New York, 2007) at 
502.  
247 Kay Goodall “Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and No Substance” (2007) 70 M L R 89 at 
113.  
FREEDOM OF HATE SPEECH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, SNYDER V PHELPS AND BEYOND.  
 44 
have pruned the statute so hard they have left a stump.”248 Conversely, commentators 
argued that extending the legislation to religion was one step too far.249 Yet instead of 
adopting a principled position for free speech advocates, arguing the incitement to 
hatred offences need to be repealed in their entirety, opponents relied on arguments 
seeking to distinguish race and religion.250 Ivan Hare stated that:251 
 
“The U.K. already has ample general criminal law provisions to deal with incitement 
to hatred and any public order consequences which may follow from it and therefore 
has no need of further restrictions which are certain to make us less free and are 
likely to prove to be counterproductive.”  
 
The varying standards adopted by the Legislature suggest Parliament is less willing to 
intervene when speech incites hatred on grounds of religion or sexual orientation, or 
considers it less of a social issue requiring the paternal hand of the state. It can be 
explicable by the perception that it is considered to be less egregious to attack 
somebody on the basis of one’s belief system, than it is to attack somebody on the 
grounds of racial composition. This however leads to the inevitable question as to 
how a more stringent legal standard can be justified for inciting hatred on the ground 
of sexual orientation. This may be rooted in a misguided public impression that one’s 
sexual orientation is an immutable concept subject to change, in comparison to one’s 
race which is an unchangeable characteristic.252 Regardless of the reasons behind the 
differing standards, the position remains that the offence of inciting hatred on the 
grounds of religion and the offence of inciting hatred on the grounds of sexual 
orientation requires proof of a positive intent to do so. Under s 18 and the offence of 
inciting religious hatred, lack of this element does not bar intervention.  
 
The role of the Attorney-General must be born in mind here. The Law Commission, 
in its report on hate crime, stated that the requirement of the Attorney-General’s 
                                                        
248 Goodall, above n 247, at 113.  
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consent acts as a “sufficient” check on free speech incursions.253 As in Canada, the 
Attorney General applies ordinary principles of sufficiency of evidence and public 
interest in determining whether to consent to a prosecution, which acts as an 
important filter against vexatious cases. As part of the Attorney-General’s 
determination, he must also act in accordance with the Human Rights Act.254  The 
role of the Attorney-General strengthens the argument that the intent requirements are 
unnecessary and the right to free speech is unlikely to be washed away in a flood of 
unmeritorious claims. Furthermore, enforcement levels for the racial incitement 
offence have been notoriously under prosecuted, with the period of 1987 to 2005 
seeing only 65 prosecutions and 44 convictions.255 However that figure is likely to be 
attributable to some hate speech incidents falling outside the limits of s 18, but 
nevertheless being prosecuted under the broader public order offence in s 5.256 
 
(b) “Threatening, abusive or insulting words” 
 
Section 5 of the Public Order Act makes it a crime to use or display threatening, 
abusive or insulting words, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress thereby.257 This ‘general disorder offence’ has been an 
important part of the United Kingdom’s legal regime in dealing with hate speech, 
despite the low threshold of what can qualify as offending behavior under the 
provision.  In Hammond v DPP 258  a Christian street preacher was successfully 
prosecuted under s 5 for holding placards which stated “Stop Homosexuality. Stop 
Lesbianism. Stop Immorality.” Lord Justice May, in finding the section had been 
breached, held freedom of expression to be an axiomatic freedom which was capable 
of restriction in certain circumstances, citing the following passage from Brutus v 
Cozens:259   
 
“… vigorous and it may be distasteful or unmannerly speech or behavior is 
permitted so long as it does not go beyond any one of three limits. It must not be 
threatening. It must not be abusive. It must not be insulting. I see no reason why 
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any of these should be construed as having an especially wide or a specially narrow 
meaning. They are all limits easily recognizable by the ordinary man. Free speech 
is not impaired by ruling them out.”  
 
It is evident that the inclusion of “insulting” has been justified to date by importing 
objective determinations into its definition. Though difficult to define, Lord Reid held 
that “an ordinary, sensible man knows an insult when he sees or hears it.” 260  It 
therefore remained a factual consideration to be determined by the Judge. This was 
understandably controversial, due to the inherent subjective nature of what constitutes 
insulting conduct. What is insulting to one person may not be insulting to another, 
giving a lot of deference to judges to determine the parameters on an ad hoc, case by 
case basis. Due to these concerns, s 5 was amended in February 2013 removing the 
term ‘insulting’ from the provision.261  
 
2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The Human Rights Act came into force in 1998 and provides that “it is unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with one or more Convention 
rights.”262 The pertinent rights in this context are freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion and freedom of assembly. Article 10(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) provides a similar justification provision to that of Canada 
and New Zealand, stating that free speech may be justifiably restricted but only when 
proved necessary in a democratic society in achieving a legitimate aim.263 The Act 
does not contain a specific hate speech provision, but acts to codify and further give 
effect to the ECHR. 
 
When the Human Rights Act was first codified there was an anticipation that 
provisions like ss 5 and 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 would be met with an influx 
of freedom of expression objections. 264  However, such incompatibility challenges 
have both been rare and unsuccessful. In Norwood v DPP265, Mark Norwood was 
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convicted under s 5 for displaying a poster in his window that read “Islam out – 
Protect the UK.” After being unsuccessful in the High Court, Norwood took the case 
to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming his article 10 free speech rights had 
been violated.266 The Court firmly confirmed Strasbourg jurisprudence that both racial 
and religious hate speech falls outside the parameters of Convention protected 
freedom of expression:267  
 
“The Court, and previously, the European Commission of Human Rights has 
found in particular that the freedom of expression guaranteed under Art 10 of the 
Convention may not be invoked in a sense contrary to Art 17 [abuse of rights]… 
The Court notes and agrees with the assessment made by the domestic courts, 
namely that the words and images on the poster amounted to a public expression 




Criticisms of the treatment of hate speech in the United Kingdom have primarily 
focused on the over-inclusiveness of s 5 of the Public Order Act. While s 5 plays an 
active role in curbing hate speech, its definition prior to amendment acted to catch 
lesser forms of speech, including speech that was ‘insulting’.268 The incorporation of 
such an elastic concept into domestic law created an excessively low threshold and 
extended the criminal law into “areas of annoyance, disturbance and 
inconvenience.”269 A legislative scheme where mere annoyance towards an individual 
dissenter’s speech could in theory result in a criminal charge is one that is overly 
paternal and extends the powers of the state into a dangerous territory. The courts in 
“exhibiting a preference for public peacefulness and the avoidance of incitement, over 
freedom of expression”270 were effectively reducing article 10 to little more than a 
paper guarantee. Essentially, prior to the amendment of s 5, the United Kingdom 
approach can be defined as an approach which was primarily “pro civility” where 
boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable speech remained unnecessarily 
vague, chilling freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly.  
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The approach of the United Kingdom is in stark contrast to the much more cautionary 
approaches of Canada and New Zealand when it comes to free speech considerations. 
As noted, the amendment repealing the inclusion of ‘insulting’ only came into force 
as of February this year. Therefore, aside from guidance in updated Police 
guidelines,271 the full effect of the repeal remains unclear. However the breadth of 
speech that will fall under this section has been substantially narrowed. The United 
Kingdom serves as a useful example of the importance of clear legislative guidance as 
to precisely what speech is being proscribed, and serves as a reminder that the hate 
speech discussion ought not to be broadened to speech that merely offends or insults.   
 
D New Zealand  
 
New Zealand’s hate speech laws are characterized by extremely infrequent 
enforcement. They can currently only be utilized by the limited portion of the public 
who have been discriminated against on grounds of color, race, ethnic or national 
origins.272  Joseph Magnet has placed New Zealand into the category of states that 
have “ratified the Racial Discrimination Convention and the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant but expressly reserve a right of non-compliance” due to a willingness to 
protect freedom of expression first and foremost. 273  Freedom of expression is 
protected by s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.274 The Court of Appeal 
in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review275 held this right to be “as wide as 
human thought and imagination”, casting a broad net as to what is protected speech 
under the provision. Section 5 however affirms the proposition that this right is not 
absolute. 276  Following the Canadian model, the New Zealand approach broadly 
protects the right to freedom of expression and then limits it with a general limitation 
clause.277 In 2004 a Select Committee was launched to enquire whether or not further 
legislation to prohibit or restrain hate speech was warranted. This enquiry has 
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ultimately led nowhere, and McNamara noted that as at 2007 “the inquiry was in 
hiatus”.278   
 
1 The Human Rights Act 1993 
 
The operative hate speech clauses in New Zealand are located in the Human Rights 
Act, a predecessor to which was the Race Relations Act 1975. The actual term “hate 
speech” does not feature in any New Zealand statutory provision. Section 61 creates a 
civil provision requiring the complainant to prove two things. First, the expression 
must be threatening, abusive, or insulting. Secondly, the expression must be 
considered likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt a person or group 
of persons on the ground of their color, race or ethnic or national origins.279 The 
speaker’s intention is irrelevant as the provision is aimed at the effect of the unlawful 
speech. In assessing whether words are threatening, abusive or insulting the courts 
adopt an objective test.280 In contrast, an objective approach was deemed unsuitable in 
the second limbs assessment of whether that speech was likely to incite hostility. 
Though care is taken not to adopt the standards of the extremely sensitive, the focus is 
on those less perceptive who are more vulnerable to be excited to hostility, due to 
predisposed views or opinions against a particular race.281 
 
Despite the section not requiring wholly objective enquiries, the Human Rights 
Commission rarely pursues s 61 complaints. Of the 210 racial disharmony complaints 
received by the Commission in 2003, none were actioned via the Commission’s 
formal channels. 282   This can be explained on three grounds. Firstly, the role of s 14 
in the Commission’s consideration of s 61 claims cannot be understated. McNamara 
is critical of this aspect, and notes the Commission has begun to employ s 14 as a 
“shield of First Amendment like proportions”. 283 Secondly the threshold at which the 
Commission can intervene has been heightened from the statute’s predecessor 
version. The present s 61 differs in a number of respects from its predecessor, the 
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most important of which was the narrowing of the offence by removing the reference 
to exciting ill will or bringing persons into ridicule. Thirdly, with the rise of 
alternative methods of dispute resolution, the Commission often opts for the 
mediation option rather than pursuing the claim through the formal complaints 
process.284 There is therefore a legitimate public concern about the efficacy of s 61 if 
racial disharmony complaints seldom reach the threshold required for formal 
intervention.  
 
Section 131 creates a criminal offence of inciting racial disharmony. A person is 
liable for bringing into contempt or ridicule a group of persons on the grounds of 
color, race, ethnic or national origin; or publishing or distributing written material that 
is threatening, abusive or insulting with the intent to excite hostility or ill-will.285 It 
requires the Attorney-General’s consent to prosecute and carries a maximum three-
month sentence of imprisonment.286  This provision is extremely underutilized, and in 
35 years has only resulted in one prosecution (under its predecessor section, s 25 of 
the Race Relations Act).287 The intent of s 131 is to prevent the incitement of hatred, 
which means it is insufficient for any material to be merely insulting if it is unlikely to 
stir others into sharing similar sentiments. The Human Rights Commission has 
attributed the lack of litigation under this section to the requirement to obtain the 
Attorney-General’s consent, and the need to establish both the intent and predict the 
likely effect of the speech in question.288  
 
2 Issues  
 
While racist hate speech laws are ‘on the books’ in New Zealand, they are currently 
being interpreted as involving such a high threshold that they are effectively beyond 
the reach of the vast majority of groups and individuals.289 Section 14 of the Bill of 
Rights Act has a key role to play in this. It is implicit in the case law that a “pro 
speech” position currently dominates the interpretation and application of racial 
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disharmony laws, in stark contrast to the “pro civility” position which has been the 
experience of the United Kingdom.  
 
There is also an identifiable gap in the law in respect of hateful attacks on minority 
groups who are discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender, 
disabilities or religion. Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Justice stated at the outset of the 
Commission’s enquiry into hate speech that arguments over whether New Zealand’s 
hate speech laws should be extended to cover inciting hatred against people on these 
grounds should be considered by the Commission.290 The Court of Appeal, however, 
has commented that the categories in s 61 and s 131 should not be extended, and 
should remain confined to categories of race and religion. 291  This status quo has 
remained unaltered to date, leaving New Zealand’s hate speech laws out of reach to 
many.  
 
The Office of Film and Literature Classification submission on hate speech found that 
the current legislative framework does not effectively address “hate speech” and that, 
although the Office has no information on the extent of hate speech in New Zealand, 
there is no reason to assume that New Zealand is especially immune, or that the social 
harm remedied by hate speech legislation elsewhere does not exist here. 292  The 
Human Rights Commission has noted that many New Zealanders remain unconvinced 
that racism exists in New Zealand to the extent that it does in other states.293 However 
the 2008 Annual Review of Race Relations contained reports of Chinese people being 
called “Asian monkeys” on the street and an African American woman being told to 
go home because she was a “blackie” and a “nigger.”294 A former Ku Klux Klan 
member has warned about the presence of organized white supremacist groups in 
New Zealand.295 While legal devices are not the only tool available to mitigate hate 
speech, New Zealand is currently heavily reliant on the negative social stigmas 
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associated with hate speech rather than the threat of prosecution through legislative 
intervention.296 
 
IV Conclusions   
 
Hate speech is a complex, transnational issue, the regulation of which has been the 
subject of considerable controversy in all three comparator states. An exposition of 
the means of combatting hate speech in Canada, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand shows varied degrees of regulation or state intervention. A general trend 
present in Canada and New Zealand is lack of enforcement, though Canada has a 
much more comprehensive statutory framework in place and judicial definitions of 
“hatred” to provide guidance and clarity. The United Kingdom has generally adopted 
a “pro civility” approach, though this trend may change with the repeal of the 
inclusion of “insulting” from section 5 of the Public Order Act in February. It acts as 
an exemplar of a state that is arguably overly paternalistic in the protection it affords 
to not only vulnerable minorities but also the wider citizenry, and demonstrates the 
problems in regulating speech that “insults”.  
 
It is evident from Snyder v Phelps however that the starting point in the United States 
remains to be that hate speech in a generically public venue may not be prohibited, 
despite the predictable harm members of the audience will experience, and the 
demonstrated inconsistencies with underlying free speech rationales. This principle 
has remained untouched by both the majority and dissenting judgment. The fear of 
stifling public debate coupled with the Courts’ free speech jurisprudence remains at 
the forefront of Judges’ considerations, and appears to be incapable of variation. Free 
and open discourse has not ground to a halt in the politically indistinguishable 
neighbour of Canada; a state this paper concludes strikes the appropriate balance 
between the rights of the speaker and the rights of the victim. Canada has recognized 
that hate speech does not contribute to public discourse, and its protection is not a 
price society should have to pay in order protect a foundational constitutional right. 
As soundly stated by Collins and Skover: “Discourse is dying in America – yet 
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everywhere free speech thrives.” 297  Perhaps the United States should follow its 
neighbour’s suit, rather than adhering to the strict letter of the First Amendment 
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